Dissenting assaults on the conventional wisdom that China's foreign policy became more 'assertive' in 2009-2010 have intensified. In this article I develop this revisionist critique in three ways. First, to make the most valid and cumulative assessment of the accuracy of the 'assertive China narrative' to date, I conceptualise its key empirical claim as a case of the general phenomenon of 'foreign policy change'. Second, based on this framework, I present a range of new empirical evidence that, taken as a whole, strongly challenges the notion of a new Chinese assertiveness. Third, since academic China and Asia experts played a pivotal role in creating the narrative, I raise a comprehensive explanation of why a great many scholars so strikingly went along with the flawed idea.
Introduction
The notion that China's foreign policy had suddenly become more 'assertive' appeared in 2009, and soon turned into conventional wisdom. The following year, in which China publicly sparred with the United States, Japan, and South Korea, can be seen as the crescendo of this supposed new assertiveness, and has been described as China and its People's Liberation Army's 'year of living arrogantly'.
1 Widespread acceptance of this 'assertive China narrative' has spurred a lively and ongoing discussion on the causes of China's alleged foreign policy change (FPC) . 2 At the same time, a dissenting smaller body of research has cast doubt on the accuracy of some of the narrative's central claims, albeit without visibly shaking the mainstream's acceptance of it.
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More recently, a timely article by Alastair Iain Johnston put the key empirical assertion of the narrative to a systematic test. 4 Johnston's study is an important step in the right direction, but it stops short of providing a complete assessment of the accuracy of the assertiveness argument, as will be shown below. The article follows up on this revisionist theme in three ways. First, to evaluate the accuracy of the narrative more precisely, and to make the assessment cumulative, I conceptualise its key empirical claim as a case of the general phenomenon of 'foreign policy change'. Second, based on this framework, I present a broad array of new empirical evidence that in sum strongly challenges the narrative. Third, I investigate why the narrative remains so popular. Not only journalists, media pundits, and bloggers, but also academics helped in creating the assertiveness idea. Moreover, since academic China and Asia experts were probably indispensable to turning the assertiveness idea into a 'social fact', 5 I offer a comprehensive explanation, divided into six micro-level causal mechanisms, of why so many scholars bought into the flawed idea. The narrative continues to inform understandings of recent great power politics in East Asia and evaluation of theories of behavioural change in China and other rising powers. I discuss these implications in the final section.
The assertiveness attributed to China is not of the benign variety-where a state proactively tackles common problems in a positive, cooperative fashion-but indicates a high-handed, often aggressive approach. 6 Johnston defines the behaviour ascribed to China as 'a form of assertive diplomacy that explicitly threatens to impose costs on another actor that are clearly higher than before '. 7 This definition is a good start, but does not fully cover the range of actions attributed to a newly assertive China. For example, China's reluctance to criticise North Korea after the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island in 2010 was seen as assertive not because China imposed higher costs on South Korea by condoning the violence (it did not), but because it opposed the US line of wanting to put further pressure on North Korea. Similarly, few people described China's 2011 tacit acceptance of the NATO-led intervention in Libya as assertive, even though it is arguable that Beijing's non-veto in the United Nations Security Council was a new policy that clearly imposed higher costs on the Gaddafi government. 8 Michael Swaine is thus correct in pointing out that identifying a stronger anti-Western or anti-US edge in China's foreign policy is central to the narrative. 9 Bearing this in mind, I define assertiveness in contemporary Chinese foreign policy as the tendency to achieve goals and resolve common problems involving the United States and its allies and partners by confrontational, as opposed to diplomatic, means. 10 The assertiveness narrative argues that such policies intensified to s degree in 2009-2010 that entailed a departure from the low-profile approach (taoguangyanghui) of the post-Mao era, 11 or at least from the renewed push for reassurance of the late 1990s. 12 The foreign policy shift is said to have occurred at a fundamental policymaking level, thereby generating simultaneous changes in several policy areas. Moreover, China's new assertiveness is described as proactive in that it was not a response to the changed policies of other actors.
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7 Johnston, 'How New and Assertive Is China's New Assertiveness?', p. 10. 8 For a different reading of China's non-veto see Yun Sun, 'China's Acquiescence on UNSCR important policy-relevant benefit. A policy change means that a state reacts differently to the same input, which should prompt sensible actors to adjust their policies towards the state in question. At the same time, the need for policy adjustments naturally decreases if the state can be expected to react similarly to the same input. In the present case, a FPC would mean that China had started acting more assertively when faced with objectively similar, although not necessarily subjectively similar, situations-since changes in China's perceptions, worldview or identity would be one of the possible explanations for the change.
18 Detailed cross-temporal comparisons with earlier relevant cases are thus a necessary tool for assessing FPC. In practical terms, a research strategy would compare China's behaviour in each allegedly assertive case in 2009-2010 with instances in the past when China faced similar circumstances. 19 To find comparable cases is not too difficult, since most of the well-published rows in [2009] [2010] are examples of long-running issues of contention between China and the outside world. In instances where comparable cases are absent, counterfactual reasoning is required.
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The belief in a new Chinese assertiveness might lead other actors to harden their China policies, which in turn could produce an assertive response from Beijing, regardless of whether a policy change existed in the first place. The study therefore needs a clear temporal end-point to minimise the risk of mixing up the causal relationships between different variables. Since most proponents of the argument agree that China's new stance softened somewhat in 2011, it seems reasonable to exclude actions that took place after 2010. The cases against which I compare China's 2009-2010 policy come from any time in the post-Mao period. Wherever possible, however, I have restricted my analysis to the decade before 2009, after China's renewed push for reassurance in the late 1990s.
Charles Hermann's renowned four-degree taxonomy allows us to classify FPC. Adjustment change describes quantitative changes in the level of effort and/or in the scope of recipients; programme change signifies qualitative change, involving new instruments of statecraft, in the methods or means by which a goal or problem is 18 The expectations of the outside world might change, which could make a state's actions appear more assertive than before. However, then we are talking about the perception of policy change of other actors, and not a policy change by the state in question. 19 Whether China's foreign policy is assertive compared to other countries is not pertinent to our investigation. 20 Let us say that we find a case where China clearly acts in an unprecedented way. However, through comparison with the most similar earlier cases and counterfactual analysis we are able to conclude that China likely would have done the same thing earlier if faced with an analogous situation. Still, why should we dismiss it as a case of FPC? After all, it is an unprecedented act and thus a 'change'. The reason is that descriptive studies of FPC are useful for IR primarily because they inform theories of behavioural change. To merely show that an act is unprecedented is not valid evidence for such theories. That is why the current definition of FPC is superior.
addressed; a problem/goal change is a change in the problem or goal of the foreign policy and international orientation change entails a complete redirection of the state's approach to international affairs. 21 Since China's alleged new assertiveness is described as incompatible with the goals of the reassurance policy, it is clearly more far-reaching than merely an adjustment or programme change. Some observers go so far as to claim that China was, in a revisionist manner, dismissing the US-led world order, so making it an international orientation change. 22 The general understanding, however, seems to be that the change fell short of this. The mainstream version thus identifies a problem/goal change. China went from stressing amiable relations with the United States, the West and its regional neighbours to singlemindedly pursuing its own narrow interests, with scant regard for the destabilising consequences.
On the whole, Johnston provides an impressively meticulous and nuanced investigation of the factual basis of the narrative. Nonetheless, his study is not free of problems. First, a number of the cases lack a comparative angle, which weakens the main thesis of Chinese foreign policy continuity in 2009-2010. For example, even though Johnston clearly demonstrates that China's reaction to Japan's detention of a trawler captain in 2010 was not as harsh as some people have claimed, this does not disprove the argument that it represents a new assertiveness. Second, Johnston's study does not include a number of the cases most frequently presented as proof of the new assertiveness. This is of course understandable, given space limitations. Nonetheless, it leaves the door open to the suggestion that the missing issues provide stronger support for the narrative. In short, while Johnston's article is the most powerful critique of the narrative thus far, it does not debunk it entirely. By including more cases and following the above outlined standard for assessing FPC, this study adds the final touches to a thorough evaluation of the accuracy of the assertiveness narrative. Furthermore, there is strong reason to believe that China and Asia scholars had a major role in transforming the flawed assertiveness argument into a widely accepted social fact. Unfortunately, however, Johnston's analysis lets scholars off the hook by presenting the narrative as a media meme. In the second part of the analysis I will return to this issue by raising an attempt at a comprehensive explanation of why so many leading academics accept a false argument as true. 26 Moreover, the conference ended with China and the United States reaching a deal, something that flies in the face of how China's new assertiveness is generally understood. Nonetheless, much of the media reporting from Copenhagen highlighted a new arrogance and swagger in China's attitude, without specifically identifying a change in its negotiating position per se. This reporting arguably helped to form the popular image of China's behaviour at the talks, and the idea was picked up in subsequent academic analysis. As one of the earlier instances of alleged new assertiveness, the portrayal of an overconfident and impudent China at one of the most high-profile international conferences in years likely played a sizeable role in cementing the wider narrative. More than any other issue, the absence of Prime Minister Wen Jiabao from the final scheduled negotiations among the 20 key delegations on December 18 was described as an intentional insult to the United States and other countries.
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The reasons for Wen's non-attendance have never been officially disclosed. There are at least two plausible alternatives to understanding it as a deliberate snub.
First, his absence might have been a protest against perceived cold-shouldering. China's ambassador for climate change Yu Qingtai told the media that Wen stayed away because China had not received an invitation to the meeting. 28 Let us suppose that China was not invited-perhaps as a result of confusion in the communications between the organiser and the Chinese delegation-and that Wen therefore decided to send a more junior official in his place. Such a move might be seen as a petty over-reaction, but it would hardly indicate a confrontational attitude. Second, Wen might temporarily have lacked a mandate to negotiate on China's behalf. 29 The need to secure backing from the other members of the politburo standing committee might possibly have complicated his negotiating position. 30 Newsweek cites an unnamed official's claim that Wen lacked the authority to make decisions at the December 18 meeting, and thus stayed away to avoid embarrassment.
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To be clear, I do not argue that these two hypotheses are more likely than the insult explanation. My point is merely to suggest that the lack of conclusive evidence for the claim that Wen's no-show was a deliberate snub, together with other plausible explanations, makes it difficult to use it as evidence of a more assertive attitude.
Result: No evidence of policy change.
Response to the US Deployment of an Aircraft Carrier to the Yellow Sea (June 2010) Shinzo's advisor Iijima Isao, however, claims that individuals in Japan's foreign ministry deliberately distorted the story to embarrass Niwa as part of ongoing ministry infighting. According to Iijima, China's foreign ministry contacted the embassy at 6 p.m., summoning Niwa to a meeting two hours later. However, the timing was not convenient for the ambassador, and the parties were not able to reschedule the meeting any time earlier than midnight. 45 Revisiting these events to some degree moderates our understanding of the intensity of China's response to the detention. The fact remains, however, that the Chinese reaction was assertive-but was it more assertive than could be expected in the light of China's behaviour during earlier disputes? A direct comparison with the most similar previous incident, which took place in 2004, suggests not.
To begin with, China, as the 'challenger' in the dispute, would naturally strive to alter the status quo in its favour. At the same time, preventing the Japanese side from doing likewise through exercise of actual sovereignty is another key Chinese priority. Active dispute management by both parties, including Japan's reluctance to solidify its administration through practical measures, previously helped to prevent the conflict escalating. 46 As many observers have pointed out, China probably understood Japan's initial resolve to prosecute the captain in 2010 as a clear break with the status quo.
47
The only precedent for 'Japan' detaining Chinese citizens in the area and pursuing the issue according to its domestic law took place in 2004.When, on the morning of March 24, seven Chinese nationalist activists landed on the largest of the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, they were arrested on suspicion of illegally entering Japanese territory. 48 Just as in 2010, the Japanese government initially declared 45 'Gaimushō nimaijita no giman "ryō domondai ha sonzaisuru" to iū ninshiki ha itsukieta no ka', . In addition to their alleged illegal entry, the activists were reported to have damaged a Shinto shrine on the island, which led the Okinawan prefectural that the issue would be handled according to domestic law. 49 However, the situation quickly altered and, on the afternoon of March 26, the activists were handed over to the immigration authorities and later released. The local prosecutor's office apparently took the decision as a result of the direct intervention of Prime Minister Koizumi Junichirō , who publicly stated that he had instructed the relevant authorities to handle the issue in such a way as to avoid negatively influencing Japan's relationship with China. 50 The 2004 incident is thus only really comparable by virtue of the initial two-day period it took the Japanese government to intervene and set the activists free. Yet, nothing in China's reaction during the first two days of the crisis in 2010 seems to have gone beyond that in 2004. To start with, China's demand in 2004 was identical with that in 2010: the immediate and unconditional release of all those arrested. China's open diplomatic measures in the first two days were also more or less interchangeable, consisting in protests lodged with Japan's foreign ministry by China's diplomatic mission, repetition of the demand at foreign ministry press conferences, and daily summoning of the head of Japan's embassy to meetings with deputy minster-level officials at the foreign ministry.
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China's threats to Japan over issues related to their territorial disputes are a regular occurrence-one study counts 26 public threats between 1978 and 2008.
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China publicly threatened or warned Japan in both our cases. In fact, during the first two days the use of this particular pressure tactic was slightly more restrained in 2010 than in 2004. From September 7-9 2010, the only public threat was made on September 7, when China's diplomatic mission in Japan lodged a 'solemn representation' (yanzheng jiaoshe) with the Japanese foreign ministry and demanded its citizens' immediate release in order to 'avoid a further escalation of the situation' (bimian shitai jinyibu shengji). The Chinese Journal of International Politics, 2014, Vol. 7, No. 1 responsibility for any further consequences. 54 In 2004 China also made threats to Japan's chargé d'affaires in Beijing, using somewhat more explicit language than in 2010. On March 24, vice foreign minister Zhang Yesui urged Japan to release the activists immediately, as failure to do so would lead to a 'magnification and complication of the situation' (shitai fuzahua he kuodahua) and 'be bound to arouse the strong indignation (qianglie yifen) of the Chinese people'. On March 25, vice foreign minister Dai Bingguo said Japan must fully understand the 'seriousness of the situation' (shitai de yanzhongxing) and made clear that if Japan prolonged the detention it would bear full responsibility for the 'serious consequences' (yanzhong houguo) that would ensue. These consequences, although not specified, would 'magnify and complicate the problem' and 'further damage' (gengjia sunhai) the bilateral relationship.
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As for additional measures, China cancelled a number of bilateral exchanges in 2010, but not during the first two days. China's foreign ministry spokesperson hinted on September 9 that talks on joint development in the East China Sea would be postponed unless Japan quickly released the fishermen. 56 In 2004, although there were no reports of cancelled exchanges during the two days leading up to the release of the activists, on March 30 Japanese officials told the media that bilateral talks on maritime issues scheduled for March 30-31 had been cancelled.
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In sum, juxtaposing the two incidents shows that China's initial reaction in 2010 was for the most part identical with its reaction in 2004. If anything, the number of the public threats in 2004 was higher, and their form and phrasing a little stronger than in 2010. A prosecution according to domestic Japanese law would from Beijing's perspective have on either occasion set the same ominous precedent. The essay does not seem to be a case of programme/goal change, since reform of the international reserve currency had been an open concern of the Chinese government for at least five years. Li Guanghui, division chief at the finance ministry, made a similar proposal in 2004 at an international conference in Shanghai.
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Zhou's essay, however, marked the first time such concerns had been expressed at such a high level. China nevertheless did not continue to actively promote the idea, the alleged ramming constituted an obstruction of official duties. Yet, China did not acknowledge that this legal distinction justified a prosecution so it is not relevant for the purposes of the present comparison. Some scholars also interpret the use of the term 'historical rights' in the most recent law on China's claims, the EEZ and Continental Shelf Act of 1998, as referring to the nine-dash line. 130 Nonetheless, the case for policy change seems stronger. 131 The 2009 submission was the first time China had connected the nine-dash line to its territorial claims at the UN. 132 China did not either attach the line to any of the key laws and regulations from the 1950s to the 1990s that serve as the legal basis of its claims. 133 But what kind of policy change was it? The inclusion of the map went unexplained, so China did not explicitly expand its territorial claims by equating them to the nine-dash line. This seems to rule out programme change. The act clearly added to the troubling ambiguity of China's claims, already demonstrated several times before, for example, by the above-mentioned reference to 'historical rights' in the 1998 law. 134 It would therefore seem to imply an adjustment change. Third, many observers highlight China's 2009 imposition of a unilateral fishing ban as reflecting its newly assertive policy. 135 The ban, however, has been imposed annually since 1999; China only expanded its duration in 2009. 136 It was thus a minor adjustment change and not a programme change. 
China's New Assertiveness Redux
To begin with, the above analysis makes clear that much of China's international behaviour in 2009-2010 quite closely fits our definition of assertiveness. In other words, China time and again took a confrontational approach towards achieving its goals and resolving problems. The issue, however, is whether or not this represents a policy change; the cross-temporal analysis reveals that only a few of China's assertive acts constituted departure from its pre-2009 policies. Table 2 combines and summarises the results of my study and Johnston's. These eleven cases were chosen due to their prevalence in the assertiveness literature. They are thus widely understood as the most obvious manifestations of a Chinese policy change, and should accordingly be 'easy' cases for the argument. Since China's foreign policy for the most part did not become more assertive here, it is likely that it did not change in other areas either. Nevertheless, we saw a number of assertive adjustment changes: (i) China for the first time openly threatened sanctions on the US companies involved in Taiwan arms deals; (ii) China's central bank governor penned an essay in which he suggested gradually moving away from sole reliance on the US dollar as the world's main reserve currency; (iii) China extended the period of its annual fishing ban in the SCS and (iv) by presenting the nine-dash line to the UN China added to the unsettling ambiguity regarding its territorial claims in the SCS.
These acts clearly pale in comparison with the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait crises; the reaction to the 1999 Belgrade embassy bombing and the aftermath of the EP-3 aircraft collision.
147 Comparisons with these well-known incidents, however, do not rule out the possibility that China's foreign policy after the ensuing reassurance push of the late 1990s became less assertive during the early 2000s, but more assertive again in 2009-2010. However, this does not seem to be the case, as the list of occasional assertive acts in [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] in Table 3 makes clear. 148 Table 3 . Occasional Chinese Assertiveness (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) Year Cases
Many of these acts were undoubtedly equally as or more assertive than the policy changes in 2009-2010. Moreover, the list could certainly be complemented with a similar one of smaller, sporadic assertive acts. All this suggests that occasional assertiveness was the normal state of affairs in China's foreign policy throughout the 2000s. It is thus extremely doubtful that the scattered policy changes in 2009-2010 amount to a general change to a more assertive foreign policy. Therefore, China's overall foreign policy did not become more assertive in 2009-2010. 149 Why Did So Many China Experts Get China Wrong in the Same Way at the Same Time?
The evidence presented and synthesized above strongly indicates that the assertive China narrative was mistaken. China's overall foreign policy did not change in 2009-2010-so why does the idea remain so popular? Johnston explains its rapid spread as the result of the power of Internet-based media-the notion of a new assertiveness became conventional wisdom through an interaction between the foreign policy blogosphere and traditional online media outlets.
150 Yet, the narrative was not limited to journalists, pundits, bloggers, and think-tank analysts. Many scholars also reproduced the idea, as a quick glance at the sources cited this article should make clear. In other words, the narrative is not only a media and a policy discourse but also an academic discourse. 151 It seems unlikely that so many China and Asia scholars uncritically bought into a media image. The mainstream acceptance of the narrative was most likely facilitated by a mutual flow of ideational influences between these related but different fields of knowledge production. In fact, there is much to suggest that academics played a special, and probably even indispensable, role in turning the narrative into a social fact.
Kelly Greenhill identifies two key variables in the transformation of 'extrafactual information' (i.e. information of unconfirmed accuracy) into a social fact in a ripe social environment: successful 'information entrepreneurs' promoting the belief, and a lack of rebuttals from authoritative sources. 152 In our case, the behaviour of scholars was of great consequence in satisfying both these conditions. First, several high-profile scholars of Chinese and Asian International Relations actively promoted the idea, through op-eds in leading newspapers and articles in the most widely read policy journals. 153 This body of work both described the features of the perceived policy change and explained its causes. This probably helped observers with more shallow China knowledge, such as the pundits, journalists, and foreign policy bloggers identified by Johnston, to interpret scattered news items according to a convincing framework. Second, until very recently there was a notable absence of authoritative experts publicly rebutting the idea. To my knowledge not a single internationally known scholar spoke out publicly against the narrative in the Western media during the critical time in 2009-2012 during which it became naturalised. Even those individuals who were critical or sceptical of the narrative fell short of dismissing it outright.
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The fact that the aggregate behaviour of scholars met Greenhill's two conditions does not imply that academics single-handedly turned the narrative into a social fact. The media dynamics, for example, no doubt also played an important role. It does suggest, however, that scholars constituted a necessary condition for this development. This begs the question: why did so many China and Asia scholars so strikingly embrace a flawed idea about their area of expertise? Johnston demonstrates that analytical flaws such as ahistoricism, implausible causal mechanisms, and selecting evidence on the dependent variable permeate much of the assertiveness literature. 155 A lack of familiarity with Chinese affairs, sometimes coupled with a lack of analytical training, could in this way account for some of the popularity of the narrative. We might also add the possibility that some people used the argument instrumentally to further their own interests.
Yet, we would expect academics to be less susceptible to each of these flaws; they are not sufficient to explain why a great many scholars on Chinese and Asian International Relations were convinced by the assertiveness idea. I therefore present an additional six causal mechanisms, each of which explains how academic China experts came to accept the narrative on an individual basis. 156 Together with the mechanisms outlined above they account for a macro-level outcome-the transformation of the assertiveness idea into a belief inter-subjectively held by great parts of the scholarly community. It should be noted that, due to space constraints, the mechanisms are only hypothesised and not tested. I can therefore say nothing about their relative causal weight. While each of them is believed to be enough to sway a particular individual, in many cases two or more mechanisms are likely to have worked in conjunction. I start by presenting those mechanisms that are able to explain cognitive biases in International Relations research in general, and then move on to the more contextually relevant mechanisms.
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There are a number of interrelated reasons for turning the gaze inwards on the scholarly community. The narrative has already had political effects, and the knowledge production behind it thus naturally becomes a highly relevant object for political analysis. Since academics had an important role in this process, they too become part of the material. This exercise involves objectifying the tools of academics (i.e. theory) by tracing the origin of systematic analytical biases to certain theoretical approaches.
158 A fuller explanation, however, should extend the search for bias to the scholarly field itself. This means looking into more deep-rooted, and often unconsciously applied, scholarly practices, as well as at psychological, social, and political mechanisms. If successfully carried out, this would contribute to a reflection on the role of our discipline in the production of social facts, which is a prerequisite for any rigorous social science practice.
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156 This only covers those scholars who came to believe the version of the assertiveness argument outlined in the introduction to this article. However, as is stated above, this should apply to most scholars promoting the idea of a new Chinese assertiveness. Moreover, I pay much attention to US-based scholars. This is because of their major role in spreading the narrative, which in turn reflects their general authority in the academic field of East Asian international relations. 157 A thorough empirical enquiry into the relative importance among the mechanisms would shed much light on the dynamics of the knowledge production of East Asian international relations. To make a tentative observation based on my reading of the assertiveness discourse, however, it seems that 'Prejudices of (Folk) Realism' has a lot of explanatory power. This is not surprising, given the immense influence of political realism among scholars. 158 For the present geographical context, this is done in for example David C. Kang, 'Getting Asia Wrong: The Need for New Analytical Frameworks ', International Security, Vol. 27, No. 4, 2003, pp. 57-85; and Steve Chan, Looking 
Informational Cascade
We rely on the information of others both to maximise our own knowledge and for social reasons. 160 This reliance comes with risks, since repeated exposure to an idea-true or false-has been shown to trigger a number of cognitive biases that can cause it uncritically to be accepted as valid. 161 Experts are not immune to this.
In fact, even a relatively limited research area, such as China's foreign policy, is so intricate and data-laden that most scholars rely heavily on the often unconfirmed information of others for even quite mundane observations. Moreover, at a certain point in time, maybe around mid-2010, the assertiveness idea was no longer something that had to be justified by pointing to China's behaviour. On the contrary, Chinese actions could readily be explained by its 'new assertiveness'. This represents a sort of tipping-point, after which the spread of the narrative was facilitated by the well-researched social mechanism of 'informational cascade', which is the mechanism by which 'people start attaching credibility to a proposition P…merely because other people seem to accept P'. 162 Or, in constructivist parlance, China was designated a new identity and its foreign policy behaviour was understood on the basis of that identity. 163 A powerful public narrative can even override personal information. 164 This mechanism is displayed in cases where evidence to the contrary was used to back up the assertiveness argument. For example, Stephanie KleineAhlbrandt of the International Crisis Group takes Beijing's muted reaction to the Cheonan and Yeonpyeong incidents as evidence of continuity in its North Korea policy. Moreover, a change in the attitude of other countries is described as having widened the gap between them and China's position. In spite of this, she argues that 'Beijing's stance on North Korea is only the latest example of its increasingly assertive foreign policy behaviour'.
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Precedence to Explaining
The popularity of the assertiveness narrative in spite of its deficiencies reminds us that describing a phenomenon is no less valuable a scholarly task than explaining its causes. 166 The first crucial step in every explanation is that of accurately describing the phenomenon being explained or, as Jon Elster puts it, 'before we try to explain a fact or an event we have to establish that the fact is a fact or that the event actually did take place'. 167 Nonetheless, it is safe to say that much International
Relations scholarship is more interested in explaining than describing social phenomena, something that arguably fuels an unfortunate tendency to be less rigorous about the dependent variable. 168 Moreover, change is often seen as more in need of explanation than continuity. 169 The numerous attempts to explain China's new assertiveness show that the perceived policy change generated a lot of interest and enthusiasm among scholars. Some might have been carried away by the assertiveness idea and let go of thorough consideration of the explanandum. Such neglect might be even more likely when one has a plausible explanation for the change in question; that is, 'If you have a compelling causal theory, everything might look like change.' 170 China is currently living through far-reaching societal change and so intuitively compelling explanations for the new assertiveness were not hard to find, as the next mechanism demonstrates.
Discursive Determinism
The 'practice turn' in International Relations theory, among other things, urges discourse analysts to be wary of neglecting how discourses affect social action.
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In other words, we should pay attention to not only what people say, but also to what they do. Similarly, a change in how people talk and write should not invariably and straightforwardly be expected to lead to a change in how they act. A number of accounts of China's new assertiveness arguably commit this 'discursive fallacy' and mistake changes in Chinese non-official discourses for a change in foreign policy. 172 Attention to the (re)formation of China's national identity is of course indispensable to our understanding of its foreign policy, not least when it comes to predicting its likely future development. Nevertheless, the level of influence of public discourse and identity construction on official policy is an empirical question and should not be treated as a fact prior to analysis. Needless to say, discursive changes in the broader society need to be mediated by changes in political priorities and the institutional set-up in order to have any long-lasting impact on policy. 173 Moreover, the study of China's foreign policy might have been especially receptive to discursive determinism, particularly in recent years. First, due to the non-transparent nature of China's policymaking processes, 'Pekingological' analyses of subtle nuances in news media outputs have long been indispensable to the study of its foreign policy. Discourse-centred approaches have a long and impressive pedigree in the field. The downside of this is that analysis sometimes tilts too heavily towards discourse and away from policy. Second, China's current debate over foreign policy includes more voices and viewpoints than it used to. 174 Not surprisingly, many have expected this noteworthy discursive change to bring with it a corresponding policy change. The assertiveness narrative thus confirmed a development that many had expected.
Prejudices of (Folk) Realism
The assertiveness narrative fulfilled popular predictions of behavioural change by rapidly rising powers in general and China in particular. The narrative was 'cognitively congruent' with the background knowledge of many people, that is, it was a close fit with what they 'believed and "knew" before they heard it'. 175 In particular, two fairly straightforward popular theories about rising powers are relevant here. Power transition theory predicts an increased risk of great power war as the capability of the rising power approaches that of the dominant power, 176 and offensive realism predicts that the rising power will seek regional hegemony by aggressively 172 Rozman, 'Chinese National Identity and Its Implications for International Relations in East challenging the dominant power. 177 Both theories foresee that China's capability will grow in tandem with increased aggressiveness, and as a consequence both could readily account for a more confrontational China. Power transition theorists and offensive realists have a track record of confirmation bias when interpreting great power politics in East Asia. 178 This is also likely to have played a role in their acceptance of the assertiveness argument. It is important to note that acceptance of the theoretical assumption under discussion here (i.e. that increased capability makes a great power more confrontational) is far from limited to self-recognized proponents of the above-mentioned theories. It is a bedrock belief in a great deal of ostensibly non-realist writings on China's rise. There are also China threat notions that have no basis in any universal logic about the behaviour of rising powers. China is instead identified as a security threat for reasons related to its political system or national identity. These ideas, however, can be as deterministic as the realism-based theories described above, since neither China's political system nor its national identity are expected to change anytime soon. 179 Contemporary Japan is one context in which we would expect to find this phenomenon. Japan's political discourse has long contained much insecurity about China's rise, a sentiment that has become more politicised in the past 15 years. 180 Moreover, the predisposition among some Japanese scholars to resort to flawed ideas that stress threatening Chinese behaviour, such as the assertiveness argument.
Disillusionment Among China Engagers
In spite of the popularity of the 'China threat' in some circles, the more policyinfluential side of the China debate in most countries, including the United States, has long been the 'engagement' camp. 183 The policy of engaging with China can cause a blowback effect that triggers recurrent hard-line turns in US China policy. Pan Chengxin argues that the engagement strategy is partly based on a dubious supposition that China will eventually converge with Western political and human rights standards. When this US 'fantasy' recurrently hits the hard wall of Chinese reality it gives rise to mass-disillusionment among China engagers, which dilutes their bargaining power with the hard-line camp and thus brings about a tougher US policy. 184 The One further development could have encouraged this tendency. Both the 2008 Beijing Olympics and the global financial crisis in different ways thrust China into the international limelight. Various aspects of China's behaviour suddenly received more mainstream attention. Routine and occasional assertiveness thus became more apparent to casual observers, such as pundits and journalists, who actively disseminated it in the mass media. A US non-specialist on China, suddenly aware of Chinese assertiveness after 2008, might possibly criticise the US government's China policy for being too lenient. Proponents of engagement, on the other hand, might stress the novelty of China's assertiveness as a defence against this kind of criticism: denouncing engagers for being too soft on China was inaccurate because the assertiveness was a recent development.
Politicised China Research
The perception that China's assertiveness reinforced US foreign policy interests by helping to justify the 'pivot' to East Asia might have boosted the popularity of the narrative among some scholars. US policy on China has in recent decades been one of engagement. The logic of the policy is based on a trade-off-the United States helps China to increase its capability and China in turn agrees to support the status quo of a US-led regional and global order. This agreement requires consistency from both parties in upholding their basic commitments. It is inherent in the assertiveness narrative that the Hu-Wen leadership-either willingly or grudgingly-de facto abandoned, or at least substantially amended, Deng Xiaoping's 'laying low' dictum. The belief that China had started to respond more aggressively to the same inputs became a reason to deter it from adventurism through a stronger 'hedge', that is, more focus on internal and external balancing. In 2011, this hedge materialised when the US government launched a plan, known as the pivot or rebalancing, gradually to concentrate its overseas force deployment in the Asia-Pacific region. The US conducted the policy in close cooperation with its regional support network, and it was thus dependent on corresponding policy changes in Japan, Australia, South Korea, and the ASEAN countries. The assertiveness idea helped to 'remind' regional countries of their belief that stability in East Asia depends on the US military, and thus became a reason to implement policies to strengthen its continuing presence there.
Thus while, on the one hand, it is self-evident that the rebalancing amounts to a further militarisation of the region, on the other, policymakers have implied that the policy is a reaction to China's rise and thus an effort to maintain the status quo. China, in suddenly starting to flex its muscles in 2009-2010, was described as having overplayed its hand or, as Lowell Dittmer puts it: 'The consensus of Western observers on this development is that China lifted the boulder only to drop it on its own feet'. 186 The rebalancing is generally portrayed as a reactive move (i.e. one that supports the status-quo) which stabilised the regional tensions instigated by a more confrontational China. The idea of the rebalancing as reactive is in many accounts dependent on a belief in an assertive Chinese policy change. The narrative changed the way China was understood, and thus how the rebalancing was understood; the narrative constituted the main reason for the rebalancing. In the United States, the academic field of Chinese and Asian current affairs is far from an ivory tower. On the contrary, contemporary US China-watching is prone to politicisation in the same way as Sovietology once was, in the sense that just about everything said about China is read as policy prescriptions. 187 The high degree of policy relevance arguably makes the field especially susceptible to direct and indirect political influence. A number of prominent scholars on China's foreign policy move regularly between universities, government offices, and research-based advocacy groups (i.e. think-tanks). Many others in part frame their research as advice on how to steer China policy in order to best promote US interests. Such close identification with one object of study runs the risk of negatively affecting research quality. It can be hypothesised that scholars, consciously or not, might be less likely to criticise ideas that are understood as beneficial to US interests-such as the assertive China narrative.
Conclusion
The first section of this article gives to the idea of China's new assertiveness a clearer and more generalizable analytical footing through drawing on the literature on FPC. Based on this conceptual refinement, the second section examines a number of the issues presented most persuasively as evidence of a Chinese policy shift in 2009-2010. My search for a new assertiveness, however, was largely futile, leading me to conclude that China's overall foreign policy had not changed in these years. Section 3 hypothesises why the assertiveness narrative became so popular in spite of its obvious flaws. I zeroed in on China and Asia scholars, a group that was crucial to creating the narrative, but which in theory would be least likely to get China wrong. I presented six hypothesised causal mechanisms that, together with instrumental usage of the narrative and three biases identified by Johnston, can explain the academic community's favourable view of the assertiveness idea.
The assertiveness narrative provides a cogent argument for the continued existence of significant US power in East Asia. The narrative was naturalised as a social fact, which was conducive to the rebalancing policy and thus benefited US interests. This process amounts to an effect of US 'structural power'-how actors' social capacities and interests are produced through social processes. 188 This observation 187 Bertil Nygren, 'American Sovietology and Knowledge Utilization in the Formulation of US holds regardless of whether or not the origin of the narrative can be traced back to agents associated with the US state apparatus, or whether or not its spread was intentional. Such considerations become irrelevant if we adhere to a non-intentional and impersonal understanding of power. What is of interest is the 'production of systemic effects', 189 of which the naturalisation of the narrative is an example.
What is more, the naturalisation of an incorrect representation of reality is, all else being equal, a greater effect of structural power than the naturalisation of a correct representation, because we can expect reality to offer resistance to false beliefs. This has an important implication for structural power analysis. The naturalisation of an incorrect belief is a least likely case of structural power. 190 The transformation of the flawed assertiveness argument into a social fact is accordingly strong evidence of US structural power in East Asia. Power is not 'fungible' in the same way as, for example, money is. 191 Hence, one kind of power resource, for example, military capability, cannot straightforwardly be translated into another kind, for example, influence over intersubjective beliefs about international security. The development outlined above provides a good illustration of this. If US influence in East Asia were only or mostly based on military might or economic resources we would have expected it to have waned in the years after the outbreak of its economic crisis. Instead, the opposite has happened-the United States was able to successfully launch the rebalancing, with China's 'new assertiveness' as the main reason, and thus boost its regional influence. This suggests that US influence cannot be fully traced back to a material basis. To solely focus on relative changes in material resources between the great powers, and ignore the crucial link between influence over knowledge production and international policy, restricts our understanding of the so-called East Asian 'power shift'. To describe the behaviour of rising powers correctly is absolutely central to many IR theories; a general framework for FPC, such as the one employed in this article, aids theory evaluation. A partial or total belief in the assertiveness idea led 189 Stefano Guzzini, 'A Reconstruction of Constructivism in International Relations', European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 6, No. 2 (2000), p. 170. 190 Thus, from this perspective it is a mistake to argue, as here exemplified by Vincent Pouliot that, 'to know if social reality is really real makes no analytical difference'. Vincent Pouliot, 'Review Article: The Essence of Constructivism,' Journal of International Relations and Development, Vol. 7, No. 3 (2004) , p. 330. In fact, the objective reality of social reality makes a big difference to studying one of the things constructivists care most about: the politics of the reification of social facts. However, to take this analytical opportunity requires accepting that we can represent reality correctly (i.e. the truth-correspondence theory), which Pouliot and many other International Relations constructivists do not. 191 David A. Baldwin, 'Power and International Relations', in Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, and Beth A. Simmon, eds., Handbook of International Relations (London: Sage, 2012), p. 278.
